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Actions such as sharing food and cooperating to reach a common goal have played
a fundamental role in the evolution of human societies. These good actions may
not maximise the actor’s payoff, but they maximise the other’s payoff. Conse-
quently, their existence is puzzling for evolutionary theories. Why should you
make an effort to help others, even when no reward seems to be at stake? In-
deed, experiments typically show that humans are heterogeneous: some may help
others, while others may not. With the aim of favouring the emergence of ‘suc-
cessful cultures’, a number of studies has recently investigated what mechanisms
promote the evolution of a particular good action. But still little is known about if
and how good actions can spread from person to person. For instance, does being
recipient of an altruistic act increase your probability of being cooperative with
others? Plato’s quote, ‘Good actions give strength to ourselves and inspire good
actions in others’, suggests that is possible. We have conducted an experiment on
Amazon Mechanical Turk to test this mechanism using economic games. We have
measured willingness to be cooperative through a standard Prisoner’s dilemma
and willingness to act altruistically using a binary Dictator game. In the baseline
treatments, the endowments needed to play were given by the experimenters, as
usual; in the control treatments, they came from a good action made by someone
else. Across four different comparisons and a total of 572 subjects, we have never
found a significant increase of cooperation or altruism when the endowment came
from a good action. We conclude that good actions do not necessarily inspire good
actions in others, at least in the ideal scenario of a lab experiment with anonymous
subjects.
Humans are unique in the animal world for their willingness to help others and collabo-
rate to reach a common goal and these attitudes are among the main reasons why human
societies are so successful1–9. Good actions, those which maximise the other’s payoff,
abound in the everyday life and experiments with anonymous people show that they are
common even in the ideal setting of a lab, where confounding factors such as long-term
strategies, indirect rewards, communication, signalling, etc., are not present10–16.
Nevertheless, not everyone behaves in such good ways and clouds of selfish people
can often be observed in both the everyday life and the lab. Some people perceive the
individual cost of restricting their individual freedom of choice as being too large and
decide to free-ride and aim for their personal benefit; consequently, people in connec-
tions with these free-riders typically decide to either break the link with the free-riders
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or to free-ride as well. Either way, this generates a cloud of defectors in the human
social network17, 18.
To avoid this suboptimal scenario, scholars have started investigating what mechanisms
can promote good actions in lab experiments. The underlying motivation is that, in case
we knew that mechanism M promotes such behaviours, then institutions could use this
mechanism to foster good actions to give rise to more successful societies.
Here we consider three different kinds of good actions: altruism, benevolence, and
cooperation. In the lab, altruistic attitudes are typically measured through the (binary)
Dictator game (DG)19, benevolent characteristics are measured using the Benevolence
game (BG)16, and cooperative tendencies are measured through the Prisoner’s dilemma
(PD)20. In the binary DG, one person, named dictator, is given an endowment of 100
Monetary Units (MUs), while the other person is given nothing. The dictator can either
take all the 100MUs for himself and leave the other person with nothing or he can
split the money evenly. The other person has no choice and receives what the dictator
decides to donate. In the BG a person is given an endowment of 100MUs and has to
decide between burning it or give it to another player. Also in this case, the other person
has no say. In the PD, two people are given 100MUs each and have to decide between
hand it over or not. If a participant hands his money over, the other participant earns
100k MUs, where k > 1. In the DG, it is optimal to keep all the money, but the good
action is to split it; in the BG a money maximiser person is indifferent between his two
strategies, while the good action is to let the other person get the endowment; in the PD,
participants are better off not handing the money over, but the good action is to hand it
over.
Virtually all studies have focused on whether mechanisms such as punishment of defectors21–24,
reward of cooperators25–27 or a combination of these two28–31 can promote cooperative
behaviour. Little is known about if and how good actions of possibly different nature
can spread from person to person. For instance, does being recipient of an altruistic
action increase your probability to cooperate with a third party? Plato’s quote ‘Good
actions give strength to ourselves and inspire good actions in others’ suggests that re-
cipients of good actions should act in a better way with others than people who were
recipient of a neutral action. Besides the clear applications that this principle, if true,
would have on finding ways to foster good behaviours in human societies, it may poten-
tially have deep consequences also in economic theory: if our actions strongly depend
on what others have previously done to us, the stability of our preferences over time
would be seriously questioned. Perhaps we were selfish yesterday because someone
was mean to us in the early morning, and we are altruist today because someone has
been kind to us this morning. Reciprocity theories32, 33 take this possibility into account
when sequential interactions among the same agents are possible. However, Plato’s
principle is supposed to apply more generally, leading to the fundamental question:
Does the behaviour of A towards B affect the behaviour of B towards C?
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Here we start investigating this question by using economic games. Our typical ex-
periment involves three people, A, B, and C. The description of the exact design is
postponed to the Methods section. Abstractly speaking, all our experiments have the
same basic structure: Person B is, at the same time, the target of a decision made by
Person A, and the maker of a decision that can affect only Person C. We investigate
whether the nature of A’s action (good or neutral) affect the nature of B’s action. Since
we are interested in seeing how B’s altruistic and cooperative tendencies change given
the choice of A, Person B will either play a Dictator game or a Prisoner’s dilemma.
This gives rise to two baseline treatments, where B is asked to play either the DG or the
PD, after being the recipient of a neutral action (endowment needed to play given by the
experimenter). By varying the way the endowment is given to Person B by Person A
(either an altruistic act in the DG or a benevolent act in the BG) we created four control
treatments, where B is asked to play either the DG or the PD after being the recipient
of a good action. In all four comparisons, and a total of 572 subjects, we have never
found statistically significant difference in the behaviour of B towards C, depending on
how A behaved towards B.
Method
We recruited subjects using the online labour market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)34–36.
As in classical lab experiments, AMT workers receive a baseline payment ($0.30 in our
case) and can earn an additional bonus depending on how they perform in the game.
AMT experiments are easy to implement and cheap to realise, since AMT workers
are paid a substantially smaller amount of money than people participating in physical
lab experiments. Nevertheless, it has been shown that data gathered using AMT agree
both qualitatively and quantitatively with those collected in physical labs in a variety of
different strategical situations17, 35–37.
Yet there are some issues that may potentially invalidate data obtained using AMT. One
of the major issues is that some subjects try to complete the HIT as fast as they can, to
get the bonus in the shortest time, and so they may not fully understand the strategic sit-
uation that they are facing, increasing the risk of collecting meaningless data. We have
addressed this problem in two different ways, depending on whether subjects acting
as Player B had to play the DG or the PD. In the PD, we asked for four comprehen-
sion questions and we automatically screened out those subjects who failed any of the
comprehension questions. Comprehension questions were formulated in order to make
clear the tension between maximising one’s own payoff and maximising the other’s
payoff. In the DG, since the strategical situation is really straightforward, we decided
to skip the comprehension questions and ask the subjects to describe the reason of their
choice. This procedure allowed us to check whether the subjects understood the deci-
sion problem, but also to address the second major issue of AMT experiments, namely
that some subjects may think that the participants they are paired with are not real. In-
deed, typically, in the description of the reason of their choice, one finds a few subjects
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saying ‘I kept the money because I think the other person is not real’, or similar state-
ments. Of course, we would like to exclude systematically this problematic subjects.
To do so, we have manually checked all the original DataSet and we have constructed
DataSetExcluded by removing those subjects belonging to one of the following cate-
gories: (i) Subjects who explicitly say that they believe that the other participant is not
real; (ii) Subjects who do not provide any reason for their choice; (iii) Subjects whose
reason of their choice was not consistent with their actual choice. This led us with
two datasets to analyse: DataSet and DataSetExcluded. Statistics are reported in the
Results section, but we anticipate that the two analyses turned out to be qualitatively
equivalent.
We now turn back to our research question and describe our two studies in more de-
tails (full instructions are reported in the Appendix). In Study 1 we have investigated
whether recipients of a good action behave more cooperatively than recipients of a neu-
tral action. In the baseline treatment, subjects in the role of Person B participated in
a neutrally framed one-shot PD. Each participant was given an endowment of $0.20
and paired with another anonymous participant (Person C). They could either keep the
$0.20 or hand it over. In this latter case, the other participant would earn $0.40. As men-
tioned before, the decision was made after passing the comprehension questions. The
two control treatments differed from the baseline treatment only in the way the initial
$0.20 was given to the participants. In Control 1, participants were informed that they
had been previously paired with another participant (Person A), different from Person
C, who was the dictator in a DG. Person A was given $0.40 and could decide between
keeping it all or splitting it with Person B and they decided to split it. Thus, in Control
1, the endowment needed to play the PD comes from an altruistic act of Person A. Con-
trol 2 was similar to Control 1, with the only difference that the $0.20 comes from a
BG. Specifically, participants were informed that they had been previously paired with
another anonymous participants (Person A) who had to decide between doing nothing
or making the benevolent act of letting the other player getting $0.20 at zero cost to
themselves. After making their decision, in each treatment participants entered the de-
mographic questionnaire, where we asked for their gender, age, level of education and,
finally, the reason of their choice in the game.
In Study 2 we have tested whether recipients of a good action behave more altruistically
than recipients of a neutral action. In the baseline treatment, subjects participated to
a binary DG. Each participant was given an endowment of $0.20 and had to decide
between keeping it and splitting it evenly with the other participant. Also in this case,
the two control treatments differed from the baseline only in the way the initial $0.20
was provided. In Control 1 they came from a donation in a previous DG; in Control
2 they came from a benevolent act in a previous BG. As mentioned before, there are
no comprehension questions in Study 2, but, as in Study 1, after making their decision,
subjects enter the demographic questionnaire, where we asked for their gender, age,
level of education, and, importantly, the reason of their choice in the game.
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After collecting the results, subjects were matched and bonuses were computed and
paid. No deception was used. Informed consent was obtained by all participants. These
experiments were approved by the Southampton University Ethics Committee on the
Use of Human Subjects in Research.
Results
A total of 232 US subjects (62.9% male, mean age = 30.4) participated in our Study
1, as Person B, passing all comprehension questions. 81 subjects (64.2% male, mean
age = 31.1) participated in the baseline and played a neutrally framed PD using an en-
dowment provided by the experimenter; 75 subjects (58.7% male, mean age = 30.4)
participated in Control 1 and played the PD using an endowment coming from a do-
nation in a previous DG; 76 subjects (65.8% male, mean age = 29.7) participated in
Control 2 and played the PD using an endowment coming from a benevolent act in
a previous BG. The average cooperation is very similar across the three treatments
(33.3% in the baseline, 33.3% in Control 1, 25.0% in Control 2). To test for an effect of
how the endowment is provided (baseline vs Control 1 and baseline vs Control 2) we
use logistic regression, with and without control on gender, age, and level of education,
predicting cooperation or defection as the dependent variable. As shown by Table 1 we
find no significant effect of how the endowment was provided. Table 3 shows the effect
of demographics on cooperation: none of the demographic characteristics we collected
predicts cooperation significantly. As mentioned in the Methods section, we now report
the statistical analysis of DataSetExcluded. In a manual screening, we excluded 9 sub-
jects and remained with 223 US subjects (62.8% male, mean age = 30.5). 79 subjects
(62.9% male, mean age = 31.3) in the baseline, 71 subjects (60.6% male, mean age =
30.4) in Control 1, and 74 subjects (64.9% male, mean age = 29.8) in Control 2. Also in
this case, the average cooperation was very similar across the three treatments (33.3%
in the baseline, 32.3% in Control 1, and 25.7% in Control 2) and Table 1 shows that the
way the endowment was provided had no statistically significant effect on cooperative
behaviour. We conclude, that a good action in the DG or in the BG does not inspire a
good action in the PD, at least in our subject pool. Impressively, reading through all
reasons provided by the subjects in the control treatments, we discovered that literally
nobody declared that his or her action in the PD was somehow influenced by how they
were previously treated.
A total of 340 US subjects (63.9% male, mean age = 39.2) participated in our Study 2,
as Person B. 112 subjects (59.8% male, mean age = 28.1) participated in the baseline
and played a neutrally framed binary DG with endowment provided by the experi-
menter; 115 subjects (57.4% male, mean age = 28.7) participated in Control 1 and
played the binary DG with endowment coming from a donation in a previous binary
DG; 113 subjects (74.4% male, mean age = 30.7) participated in Control 2 and played
the binary DG with endowment coming from a benevolent act in a previous BG. The
average choice (Keep = 0, Split =1) is very similar across the three treatments (0.43
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in the baseline, 0.42 in Control 1, 0.48 in Control 2). To test for an effect of how
the endowment is provided (baseline vs Control 1 and baseline vs Control 2) we use
logistic regression, with and without control on gender, age, and level of education,
predicting keeping or splitting as the dependent variable. As shown by Table 2 we find
no significant effect of how the endowment was provided. Table 3 shows the effect
of demographics on cooperation: females donated significantly more than males and
age had a borderline significant positive effect on altruism. As mentioned in the Meth-
ods section, we now report the statistical analysis of DataSetExcluded. In a manual
screening, we excluded 24 subjects and remained with 316 US subjects (62.7% male,
mean age = 29.3). 108 subjects (58.3% male, mean age = 28.1) in the baseline, 102
subjects (54.9% male, mean age = 29.3) in Control 1, and 106 subjects (74.5% male,
mean age = 30.5) in Control 2. Also in this case, the average choice was very similar
across the three treatments (0.45 in the baseline, 0.47 in Control 1, and 0.50 in Control
2) and Table 1 shows that the way the endowment was provided had no statistically
significant effect. We conclude, that a good action in the DG or in the BG does not
inspire a good action in the DG, at least in our subject pool. We mention that, this time,
reading through all reasons provided by the participants in the control treatments shows
that several players were influenced by how they were previously treated. To be more
precise, 15 out of 102 subjects in Control 1 Excluded declared ‘The other participant
chose to split his 40 cents with me, so I elected to pass on the love and do the same’ or
equivalent statements. A similar thing happened in Control 2. Thus there is a psycho-
logical effect, but it does not give rise to an economically and statistically significant
effect. It is then possible that those people who reported to be positively influenced by
the other’s choice would split the money anyway.
Finally, a total of 175 US subjects were recruited to play the role of Person A (90 in
the DG and 85 in the BG). Note that the statistics in Table 3 do not include these par-
ticipants, since they played a different DG ($0.40 at stake, instead of $0.20). Statistics
on these subjects are not significant, probably due to the relatively small sample. We
used these subjects only to avoid deception and match the players in the role of Person
B with a real participant.
Discussion
Good actions are defined as those which maximise the other’s payoff. Sharing the
endowment in the binary Dictator game (DG), letting the other person take the endow-
ment in the Benevolence game (BG), cooperating in the Prisoner’s dilemma (PD), are
all examples of good actions. Motivated by Plato’s quote ‘Good actions give strength
to ourselves and inspire good actions in others’ we have investigated whether good ac-
tions of possible different types can spread from person to person in the simplest pos-
sible way: does a good action of A towards B increase the probability of a good action
of B towards C? We have conducted six experiments: two baseline treatments where
B has to make a decision in either the DG or the PD using an endowment given by
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the experimenter; four control treatments where the endowment needed to play comes
from either an altruistic action or a benevolent action made by someone else in a pre-
vious interaction. Across four comparisons and 572 participants we have never found
a significant increase of good actions by player B when they were recipient of a good
action.
Our results provide evidence that good actions do not spread from person to person,
at least in our ideal case where interactions happen through Amazon Mechanical Turk
and are therefore completely anonymous.
However, we recommend caution in the interpretation of our results. One of the major
limitations of AMT experiments is that it is virtually impossible to convince the par-
ticipants that the people they interact with are real. To address this problem, we asked
the subjects to write the reason of their choice and conducted two statistical analyses,
one including all participants and one including only those whose description revealed
that they were playing as they would do in reality. Although the two analyses gave
qualitatively equivalent results, we cannot be completely sure that all participants in
the second analysis acted as they would act in a real scenario: it is possible that they
described a reason consistent with a real scenario, but behaved as the other participants
were not real. On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to design an experiment where
participants are made completely convinced that the other participants are real, with-
out generating confounding factors. For instance, showing pictures, names, or TurkIDs
would decrease the ‘distance’ between the participants with the consequence of in-
creasing good actions, as shown by a number of similar studies38–40. Consequently,
it would be difficult to understand which cause gives rise to which effect. This issue
connects to the problem of whether good actions inspire good actions in others in the
everyday life. Everyday good actions are typically accompanied by eye-contact, small
talks, smiles, and other kinds of signals. It is likely that these signals contribute to
improve the recipient’s mood so that the recipient’s utility is the sum of his material
payoff and his nonmaterial payoff given by the fact that his mood has been indirectly
improved by other factors. It is then possible that it is not really the fact of being re-
cipient of a good action that inspires other good actions, but the fact that the mood has
been improved.
Our results also contribute to the increasing body of literature regarding gender differ-
ences in the Dictator game. Alike the majority of studies41–48, but not all45, 48, 49, we
too have found that females are significantly more generous than males in the Dictator
game. Furthermore, consistent with Engel’s meta-study50, we too have found that age
has a positive effect on giving in the DG, though our effect is only borderline significant
(P = 0.05 in DG and P = 0.092 in DG excluded).
Finally, our results add to the research concerning framing effects in the Dictator game
and the Prisoner’s dilemma. A number of studies45, 47, 51 agree that behaviour in the
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Dictator game is independent of the name of the game (Keep game vs Take game) and
the name of the strategies (Keep vs Give). Here we have shown that it is independent
of how the endowment is provided (by the experimenter vs by someone else through a
good act). Similarly, a number of studies52–63, but not all64–66, suggest that behaviour in
the Prisoner’s dilemma depends on the name of the game and the name of the strategies.
Here we have shown that it does not depend on how the endowment is provided.
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Full Instructions of Study 1
Here we report the full instructions for Control 1. The instructions for Baseline and
Control 2 were very similar and we highlight the differences along the description.
The first two screens do not contain any information about the game and serve us only
as control to avoid multiple plays from the same subject and lazy participants who can
increase randomness on our data.
Screen 1. In the first screen, participants were welcomed to the game and asked to type
their worker ID. This allows us to automatically exclude workers who have already
completed the task.
Screen 2. In the second screen, we asked the participant to transcribe a relatively long
neutral piece of text. This allows us as to tell computers and humans apart (CAPTCHA)
and, at the same time, to exclude lazy workers and minimise randomness in our data.
We used a meaningless neutral text in order to avoid framing effects.
In the third screen, people entered the real game. Here is the exact instructions we
used.
Screen 3. Welcome to this HIT. This HIT will take about ten minutes. For the partici-
pation to this HIT, you will earn $0.30. You can also earn additional money depending
on the decision you and the other participants will make. You will be asked to make
two decisions. There is no incorrect answer. However, to make sure you understand
the situation, we will ask some simple questions, each of which has only one correct
answer. If you fail to correctly answer any of those questions, the survey will automat-
ically end and you will not receive any redemption code and consequently you will not
get any payment. With this in mind, do you wish to continue?
Here participants could either continue or end the survey, clicking on the corresponding
button. Participants who decided to continue were directed to the next screen.
Screen 4 (Control 1) In a previous part of the HIT, which you have not seen, you
were paired with another participant. This participant was given $0.40 and had to de-
cide between keeping it all or splitting it evenly with you. He decided to split. So..
congratulations! You now have $0.20.
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Screen 4 (Control 2) In a previous part of the HIT, which you have not seen, you were
paired with another participant. The other participant was told that there were $0.20
available but she or he could not get it. They could only choose between doing nothing
or donating it to you. He decided to donate. So.. congratulations! You now have
$0.20.
Screen 4 (Baseline) In the Baseline treatment participants jumped from Screen 3 to
Screen 5.
Screen 5. You have been paired with another participant, different from the one you
were paired before. The amount of money you can earn depends on your and the other
participant’s decision. You and the other participant have both $0.20, earned in the
previous part of the HIT. You must decide whether to hand it over or not. Each time a
participant hands over their $0.20, the other participant earns $0.40. So:
1. If you both decide to hand over the $0.20, you end the game with $0.40
2. If the other participant hands it over and you do not, you end the game with $0.60
3. If you hand it over and the other participant does not, you end the game with $0
4. If neither of you hand it over, then you end the game with $0.20
Of course, in the Baseline, we took out the sentence ‘different from the one you were
paired before’.
Screen 6. Here are some questions to ascertain that you understand the rules. Re-
member that you have to answer all of these questions correctly in order to get the
completion code. If you fail any of them, the survey will automatically end and you
will not get any payment.
1. What choice should YOU make to maximise YOUR gain?
2. What choice should YOU make to maximise the OTHER PARTICIPANT’s gain?
3. What choice should the OTHER PARTICIPANT make to maximise THEIR gain?
4. What choice should the OTHER PARTICIPANT make to maximise YOUR gain?
In each questions, participants could answer by selecting either ‘Do not hand over’ or
‘Hand over’. Participants failing any of the comprehension questions were automati-
cally screened out through a ‘Skip Logic’, which is very easy to implement using the
survey builder Qualtrics.
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Screen 7. Now it’s time to make your decision. What is your choice?
Here participants could select either ‘Do not hand over’ or ‘Hand over’. Following
this screen, we asked demographic questions and the description of the reason of their
choice. A final screen, providing a completion code to claim for their payment, con-
cluded the survey.
Full Instructions of Study 2
Here we report the full instructions for Control 1. The instructions for Baseline and
Control 2 were very similar and we highlight the differences along the description.
Moreover, since some screens were identical to those of Control 1 in Study 1, we report
only those screen containing some differences.
Screen 5. You have been paired with another participant, different from the one you
were paired before. You must decide between keeping all your $0.20 or splitting it
evenly with the other participant. This decision is unilateral. The other participant does
not have the possibility to influence your payoff.
Of course, in the Baseline, we took out the sentence ‘different from the one you were
paired before’.
Screen 6. As mentioned in the Main Text, Study 2 does not contain any comprehension
questions. So subjects passed directly from Screen 5 to Screen 7.
Screen 7. What is your choice?
Here participants could select either ‘Keep’ or ‘Split’. Following this screen, we asked
demographic questions and the description of the reason of their choice. A final screen,
providing a completion code to claim for their payment, concluded the survey.
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Table 1: The effect of being recipient of a good action on cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. We used logistic
regression with and without control on sex, age, and education, using ‘treat’ as a dummy variable. We report the β-value,
its standard error, and the significance level. ‘Bas’ stands for ‘Baseline’, ‘Con’ for ‘Control’, and ‘Exc’ for ‘Excluded. So,
for instance, the column ‘Bas Exc vs Con 1 Exc’ reports the results of the regression using Bas Exc = 0 and Con 1 Exc
=1 as dummy variable. We find no significant effect of the dummy variable on cooperation in the PD. Being recipient of a
good action does not significantly increase the probability of cooperating in the PD.
Bas vs Bas vs Bas Exc vs Bas Exc vs Bas vs Bas vs Bas Exc vs Bas Exc vs
Con 1 Con 1 Con 1 Exc Con 1 Exc Con 2 Con 2 Con 2 Exc Con 2 Exc
dummy for decision
treat –.000 .043 –.405 –.419 –.405 –.419 –.405 –.419
(.34) (.34) (.36) (.36) (.36) (.36) (.36) (.36)
sex .020 –.198 –.198 –.198
(.35) (.38) (.38) (.38)
age –.012 –.004 –.004 –.004
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
education .291 .252 .252 .252
(.16) (.17) (.17) (.17)
Constant –.693** –1.620 –.693** –1.399 –.693** –1.399 –.693** –1.399
(.24) (.99) (.24) (1.02) (.24) (1.02) (.24) (1.02)
Pseudo R2 .000 .019 .007 .019 .007 .019 .007 .019
No. of cases 156 156 157 157 157 157 157 157
Significance level: *** : p < 0.001 ** : p < 0.01 * : p < 0.05
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Table 2: The effect of being recipient of a good action on altruism in the Dictator game. We used logistic regression with
and without control on sex, age, and education, using ‘treat’ as a dummy variable. We report the β-value, its standard
error, and the significance level. ‘Bas’ stands for ‘Baseline’, ‘Con’ for ‘Control’, and ‘Exc’ for ‘Excluded. So, for instance,
the column ‘Bas Exc vs Con 1 Exc’ reports the results of the regression using Bas Exc = 0 and Con 1 Exc =1 as dummy
variable. We find no significant effect of the dummy on donations in the DG. Being recipient of a good action does not
significantly increase the probability of splitting the endowment in the DG.
Bas vs Bas vs Bas Exc vs Bas Exc vs Bas vs Bas vs Bas Exc vs Bas Exc vs
Con 1 Con 1 Con 1 Exc Con 1 Exc Con 2 Con 2 Con 2 Exc Con 2 Exc
dec
treat –.082 –.115 .068 .024 .163 .257 .186 .289
(.27) (.27) (.28) (.28) (.27) (.28) (.27) (.29)
sex .545 .436 .624* .619*
(.28) (.29) (.31) (.31)
age .030 .028 .015 .015
(.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
education .047 –.006 –.194 –.229
(.11) (.12) (.11) (.12)
Constant –.251 –2.078** –.186 –1.556* –.251 –.746 –.186 –.520
(.19) (.74) (.19) (.76) (.19) (.74) (.19) (.77)
Pseudo R2 .000 .032 .000 .023 .001 .032 .002 .035
No. of cases 227 227 210 210 225 225 214 214
Significance level: *** : p < 0.001 ** : p < 0.01 * : p < 0.05
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Table 3: Impact of demographic variables on individual decision in the DG and
the PD before and after exclusion of subjects. We used logistic regression and
report the β-value, its standard error, and its significance level. Females donate
significantly more than males in the DG. Borderline positive effects of age on
altruism in the DG and education on cooperation in the PD were also noted.
DG DG Exc PD PD Exc
dec
sex .671*** .594** .136 .060
(.18) (.19) (.30) (.30)
age .015* .017 –.001 –.004
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
education –.092 –.150 .209 .278*
(.08) (.08) (.14) (.14)
Constant –1.140* –.711 –1.886* –1.994*
(.46) (.48) (.81) (.84)
Pseudo R2 .029 .029 .010 .015
No. of cases 340 316 232 223
Significance level: ***: p < 0.001 ** : p < 0.01 *: p < 0.05
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